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CASE COMMENTS

At least one state legislature has, however, taken a more
liberal view of the rights of students enrolled in state-supported
institutions of higher learning. Oregon has declared the University
of Oregon to be a state agency thereby subjecting it to the Oregon
Procedure Act.25 This Act requires that a proceeding in a state
agency include reasonable notice, right to counsel, compulsory
process, cross-examination, evidentiary limitations, and written findings.26 As one noted commentator observed, "Nothing is lost by
giving the student the chance to confer with a counsellor during
the proceedings if he wishes. His confidence is bolstered and the
committee might be aided."2 Professor Seavey has observed, "It is
shocking that the officials of a state educational institution . . .
should not understand the elementary principles of fair play. It is
equally shocking to find that a court supports them in denying to a
student the protection given to a pickpocket."28

M.

CONCLUSION

It appears as though the law requires only the barest semblance
of procedural due process in college disciplinary proceedings, even
though a student's opportunity to continue his education may be
substantially affected. As exemplified in Dixon, a student may
not be expelled without at least notice and a hearing. Therefore, it
appears that whether or not a student will be allowed to utilize
counsel in a disciplinary hearing will be determined by the particular
practices of the school involved.
Gary Gordon Markham
Larry Andrew Winter

Constitutional Law-Validity of Safety
Helmet Requirements
The State of Michigan amended its motor vehicle code to require all persons operating a motorcycle to "wear a crash helmet
25 ORE. REv. STAT.
26
ORE.I V.STAT.
27

§ 352.010 (1965).
§§ 183.420-470 (1965).
Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54

CALin.
2 8 L. REv. 73, 79-80 (1966).

Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAv.L. Rv.1406,
1407 (1957).
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approved by the department of state police."' The American Motorcycle Association requested a declaration of rights as to the constitutionality of the amendment. The Motorcycle Association contended that the statute violated the ninth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution in that it was concerned solely
with the safety of the motorcyclist and had no relationship to the
safety or the well-being of the public. The circuit court upheld the
amendment and the Motorcycle Association appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Michigan. Held, reversed. The scope of the statute
exceeds the limit placed on the police power of state government by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. American
Motorcycle Association v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 1968).
Two of the more difficult problems faced by courts of the United
States in interpreting the Constitution involve the broad, rather
nebulous terms, "police power" 2 and "due process of law." 3 When

these concepts are put forward by opposing parties in support of
conflicting policies and the court is faced with balancing the interests

IMici.

Ch. 75b, § 9.2358(d) (1966).
power is the term used by courts to refer to the sovereign right
of a government to exercise its power for the promotion of order, safety,
health, morals, and the general welfare of society. Under our system of
government, it denotes those inherent powers which are reserved to the
several states. In re Lindsay, 12 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Iowa 1935). It encompasses preventive, punitive, and regulatory measures. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925). The very foundation of police power is the control
of private interests for the public welfare. The injured person is, in theory,
compensated by sharing in the benefit to society. See, e.g., Weber City
Sanitation Comm. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955). Yet,
the police power is not without limit. It must be exercised in such a way
that the public as a whole will be benefited. A fundamental individual
right must yield to police power only when the public welfare will be clearly
promoted. Christian v. LaForge, 194 Or. 450, 242 P.2d 797 (1952). See also
Essert, What is Meant by the Police Power"?, 12 NEB. B.A. BULL. 208, 217
(1933).
3 Attempts to give "due process of law" an inclusive definition have
usually resulted in the use of words as vague as "due process" itself. Originally, the phrase applied only to procedural questions. When used in that
manner, it has been referred to in many ways. See Owens v. Battenfield,
33 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 605 (1929) (the general
rules of society); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (fair play); Goddard
v. Frazier, 156 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 765 (1946)
(fundamental fairness); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (rights which
are basic to our free society). When applied to substantive rights, due process
is perhaps primarily a guarantee that government may not deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property by an act that has no reasonable
relation to any proper governmental function. As set out in the fourteenth
amendment, it provides a guarantee by the federal government that no state
shall infringe on the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen. See
U.S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Kadish, Methodology and Criteria
in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319
(1957); Carpenter, Substantive Due Process at Issue: A Resume, 5 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 47, 50 (1958).
STATUTES ANN.

2 Police
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of the opposing sides, the difficulty is often great and the applicable
law often confusing. The American Motorcycle case involves a conflict between a fundamental individual right protected by "substantive
due process" and the "police power" of the state of Michigan.
The question presented is whether a legislative enactment which
takes away the individual's freedom to ride his motorcycle without
wearing a state-approved helmet violates the requirements of due
process of law.
Basically, there is such a violation if it does not lie within the
police power of the state to infringe upon such freedom. Such infringement does not lie within the police power of the state if it
is not reasonably designed to protect the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare of the public.
The individual right in question is nowhere definitively set forth
in the Constitution. Rather it might be characterized as that "natural" right, which every man possesses-that "the individual is not
accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the
interests of no person but himself." 4 Mr. Justice Brandeis described
this principle in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States'
as "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." Apparently, the scope
of the protection afforded the citizen by the due process clause extends to such "natural" rights.6
Similarly, there is little doubt that legislation of the type in question in the instant case involves rational social policy. There are
ample statistics which show that as the number of motorcycles in
use across the nation increases, the number which are involved
in accidents increases. 7 The number of severe head injuries which
result from these accidents, many because of failure by cyclists to
use protective devices, is of concern to all.' This is surely the ra4J. S. MILL, UTI.TARrANsM, LBERTY AND REPRESENTATIm GoVERNMENT (1950 ed.). That this right exists even though not enumerated in the

Constitution is evident from the "grant of power" theory of our system of

government. It is preserved by the ninth amendment to the Constitution.
(dissenting opinion). The right to be let
5277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
alone has also been held to be guaranteed by the ninth amendment. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 United States v. Bailes, 120 F. Supp. 614, 627 (S.D.W. Va. 1954);
Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wis. 157, 240, 142 N.W. 595, 619 (1913).
7 The accident rate for motorcycles far exceeds that for automobiles.
American Motorcycle Association v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 n.9 (Mich.
1968).8
See People v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (Genesee County
Ct. 1968).
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tionale for those decisions in other jurisdictions which have upheld
similar legislation when it came under constitutional attack."
Yet these courts have been forced to employ rather strained reasoning to support their decisions. To show that police power had
been properly invoked in these circumstances, it was argued that
"flying stones . . . from the wheels of moving vehicles"'" might hit
the cyclist in the head causing him to lose control and injure others
on the highway. Another court" warned of the danger of hardshelled beetles or bees causing the cyclist to lose control. The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island mentioned that "fallen objects such
as . . . tree branches" 2 might cause a cyclist to lose control. However, as is cogently pointed out by the court in the American Motorcycle case, if the legislative purpose was really to deflect flying objects, rather than to reduce head injuries, this objective would
more reasonably be reached by requiring the manufacturer to install
a windshield on all motorcycles. 3
A proposed bill, similar to the statute in the instant case, is
currently being introduced to the 1969 session of the West Virginia
legislature. 4 Arguments in support of the constitutionality of such
a law need not be limited to those concerning the possibility of
injury to the cyclist and others caused by flying objects and falling
trees. For example, there seems to be some merit in contending
9People v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931, 935 (Genesee County Ct.

1968); State v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968); People v. Schmidt,
283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie County Ct. 1967); People v. Bielmeyer, 282
N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
People v. Schmidt, 283 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (Erie County Ct. 1967).
1 People v. Bielmeyer 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
,2 State v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (R.I. 1968).
' 3 American Motorcycle Association v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75
(Mich.4 1968).
' H.D. 519, 59th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1968) House Bill Number 519 in
West Virginia Legislature. The bill would amend article 15, chapter 17-(C)
of the Code of West Virginia by adding six new sections, designated sections
44-49. The bill would provide for the use of helmets, goggles, and face
shields by motorcyclists and establish requirements for motorcycle equipment.
Section 44 is the section pertaining to helmets:
No person shall operate or be a passenger on a motorcycle which is in
motion unless he shall be wearing a protective helmet of a type
approved by the commissioner of motor vehicles. Such a helmet, which
shall be worn on the head of the operator or passenger, must be equipped
with either a neck or chin strap which shall be fastened securely while
the motorcycle is in motion. The commissioner of motor vehicles is
hereby authorized and empowered to adopt and amend regulations
covering the types of helmets and the specifications therefor and to
establish, maintain and distribute to law enforcement agencies throughout
the state a list of approved helmets which meet the specificiations determined by the commissioner.
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that the great incidence of head injuries caused by motorcycle accidents results in a large number of these victims becoming wards
of the state whose support is then borne by the public. Also, the
economic interest of motorcyclists as a class surely extends to the
cost of insurance, and as the number of cyclists increases,"5 their
economic influence on the public increases. It has been said that
protection of the safety of the public includes its economic safety.' 6
In addition, some courts have relied upon the expanded police power
of the states when regulating the use of their highways. 7
Whether this bill, if passed, would be found constitutional in
West Virginia is not clear. In close questions of policy such as the
one involved in this type of regulation, it might well be argued
that courts should yield to the judgment of the legislature. But
it should be remembered that one of the foremost proponents of
this concept, Mr. Justice Brandeis, also felt that the greatest threats
to individual liberty often lay in beneficent legislation.' 8
William Alex Tantlinger

Eminent Domain-Is Noise an Element of Damage?
The Dennisons were owners of a home in a remote wooded area
in Lake George, New York. The property was entirely secluded,
quiet, and peaceful. As a result of highway construction, some
of this secluded property was condemned to make way for an
interchange. The seclusion and beauty of their property was replaced by the noise, lights, and odors of the traffic on the new
highway. In awarding damages for the partial taking, the Court of
Claims considered as factors to determine the damage to the remaining property the loss of privacy and seclusion, the loss of
view, the traffic noise, lights, and odors. The Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed. The state appealed contending it was error
"5From 1961 to 1965, motorcycle registration increased 285%. People
282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
v. Bielmeyer,
6
1 Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124 P.2d 593 (1942).
'7 Peop1e v. Bielmeyer, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (Buffalo City Ct. 1967).
18 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
(dissenting

opinion). Justice Brandeis said:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.
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